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As students of international law know, there has been a long
standing dispute between the United Kingdom and the United States
over the doctrines of jurisdiction and sovereignty in the practice of in-
ternational law. In two parts our nations do not quarrel. First, we
agree that every nation has the right to exercise jurisdiction over its
nationals and over non-nationals within its territory. Second, we agree
that every nation has the right to exercise personal jurisdiction over its
nationals residing abroad.
There is, however, another part of the doctrine in which we disa-
gree. American law students are taught that, when there has been a
substantial and foreseeable effect from abroad upon a nation's persons
or institutions (including the economy itself), then that nation has the
right to exercise jurisdiction over those persons or corporations whose
activities, albeit abroad, have had this effect. We have been aware for a
number of years that you believe this to be a valid exercise of jurisdic-
tion in international law. It was well put, however much we may disa-
gree with it, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),'
when Judge Learned Hand noted that "any state may impose liabili-
ties, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its
* Third Baron Hacking of Chorley; member, House of Lords, British Parliament.
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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borders that has consequences within its borders which the state repre-
hends .... *2 We take a somewhat different view of the matter. In
the words of Viscount Dilhorne, in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westing-
house Electric Corp. ;3 "[flor many years now, the United States has
sought to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of acts done
outside the jurisdiction of that country. This is not in accordance with
international law. .. .
This disagreement is now one of increasing worry to us. I am
bound to tell you, in a voice of friendliness, and not hostility, that we
are disturbed for you, for us, and for international trade. We are dis-
turbed that agencies of the United States government, over an ever-
widening field of international commerce, are persistently making more
and more attempts to impose domestic laws on persons and corpora-
tions who are not U.S. nationals and who are acting outside the terri-
tory of the United States. I do not think it is an unfair question to ask
how you [Americans] would respond if other nations attempted to do
the same to you. Without putting it tritely, the United States was
founded by those who took exception to little matters of taxation being
imposed extraterritorially.
It would probably surprise you to learn how extensive is the appli-
cation of U.S. law abroad. Without burdening you, allow me to pro-
vide a few examples in areas which give us much concern.
The field of antitrust law is of first and foremost concern. Refer-
2 Id at 443. Alcoa is best known as the case in which the Aluminum Company of America
was found to have monopolized the manufacture and sale of virgin aluminum ingot in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)). The original complaint, filed on April 23, 1937, however,
named sixty-three defendants. Among these was Aluminum Limited, a Canadian corporation
charged with having conspired with French, German, Swiss and British corporations to restrain
trade in the United States. In 1936, Limited entered into an agreement with these corporations to
restrict exports to the United States. Each corporation was granted a fixed free export quota, with
royalties to be paid on exports exceeding the quota. Although the district court had found that the
export quota restrictions had not materially affected the foreign trade or commerce of the United
States, the court of appeals reversed, holding an agreement to withdraw a substantial part of the
supply from the market as illegal per se. 148 F.2d at 421, 442-45.
3 [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L.). In Westinghouse, a number of utility companies had instituted
civil proceedings against Westinghouse for alleged breaches of contracts to supply uranium.
Westinghouse contended in its defense that performance had been rendered impossible by the
existence of a uranium cartel which restricted supply and fixed prices. To prove the existence of
the foreign cartel, Westinghouse applied to the district court for the issuance of letters rogatory
addressed to the High Court of England. In these letters, the district court requested the High
Court to summon certain directors and employees of Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation to give oral
testimony and provide written documents to an examiner in London. In the proceedings in En-
gland, a High Court master had issued an order giving effect to the letters rogatory. On appeal,
however, this order was unanimously overturned by the High Court.
4 Id at 460.
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ence has already been made to the Alcoa case. Similarly, United States
v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. 5 held that the Sherman Act ex-
tended extraterritorially to a British company which allegedly con-
spired with others to divide world markets.6 United States v. The
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center7 provides classic illus-
tration of the foreign policy implications of extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws. In Watchmakers, the United States brought a
civil antitrust action against two Swiss watchmakers. Following the en-
try of a final decree, the Department of Justice was forced to seek mod-
ification because of a resulting strain in U.S.-Swiss relations.
The encroachment of U.S. antitrust law abroad has been gradual
but steady. We do not oppose the rationale of antitrust; on the con-
trary, we recognize the importance of these laws in the conduct of fair
and good business within any free enterprise system. The United
Kingdom has its own laws against monopolies and unfair trade prac-
tices. 8 We do, however, take exception to the belief that antitrust objec-
tives can be achieved internationally only by the extraterritorrial
application of U.S. laws.
The United States Department of Justice in its Antitrust Guidefor
International Operations9 put its case with admirable candor:
The application of U.S. antitrust laws to overseas activities raises
some difficult questions of jurisdiction .... U.S. law in general, and the
U.S. antitrust laws in particular, are not limited to transactions which take
place within our borders. When foreign transactions have a substantial
and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, they are subject to U.S. law
regardless of where they take place .... Accordingly, considerations of
jurisdiction, enforcement policy, and comity often, but not always, lead to
the same conclusion: the U.S. antitrust laws should be applied to an over-
seas transaction when there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the
United States commerce; and consistent with these ends, it should avoid
5 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 195 1),final decree issued, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
6 Judge Ryan held that "the law is crystal clear: a conspiracy to divide territories, which
affects American commerce, violates the Sherman Act." 100 F. Supp. at 592.
7 [1965] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 71,352 (S.D.N.Y.). Watchmakers had an extensive pre-
trial history. See 27 F.R.D. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 25 F.R.D. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); 25 F.R.D. 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); 25 F.R.D. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); 25 F.R.D. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); 168 F. Supp. 904
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
8 See Resale Prices Act, 1976, c. 53, §§ 1-11; Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1976, c. 34; Fair
Trading Act, 1973, c. 41 (which replaced the Monopolies and Merger Act, 1965, c. 50, and the
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66);
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1968, c. 66; and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz.
2, c. 68.
9 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (1977), reprinted in [1977-1978 Extra Edition] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), No. 266.
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unnecessary interference with the sovereign interests of foreign nations. '0
It is at this point that the authors of the Guide glide so smoothly over
the troubled waters:
For example, to use the Sherman Act to restrain or punish an over-
seas conspiracy whose clear purpose and effect is to restrain significant
commerce in the U.S. market is both necessary and appropriate to effec-
tive U.S. enforcement ...
• . . The general trend of modern history has been to expand the
personal jurisdiction of our courts to reach those who transact business in
a certain place, even if they are not "found" there in a traditional jurisdic-
tional sense. The Department will utilize these principles to seek to exer-
cise the fullest permissible jurisdiction over those who illegally cartelize
our markets." l
A second area in which extraterritorial application of U.S. laws
provides concern is in securities law. It has long been held that if these
laws are to be effective within the United States, there must be some
extraterritorial application. Although section 30(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193412 seems to exempt transactions conducted
outside the territorial limits of the United States,' 3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded otherwise:
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterrito-
rial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased
foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic se-
curities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in Amer-
ican securities. In our view, neither the usual presumption against
extraterritorial application of legislation nor the specific language of Sec-
tion 30(b) show Congressional intent to preclude application of the Ex-
change Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the United States
which are effected outside the United States, when extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Act is necessary to protect American investors.'
4
One of the most recent examples of proposals to increase the extra-
10 Id at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
I I Id at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
12 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976) (originally enacted as Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404,
§ 30(b), 48 Stat. 881).
13 Section 30(b) provides:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to
any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the
United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulation
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion of this title.
Id
14 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), rev'don other grounds en banc, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). Courts in the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have followed Schoenbaum. See Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir.
1977); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Recaman v. Barish, 408 F.
Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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territorial application of U.S. securities law lies in a 1977 release issued
by the Securities and Exchange Commission.' 5 The Commission pro-
posed to put upon foreign private issuers the same reporting require-
ments as those imposed upon domestic private issuers. As Richard
Roeder said in a speech before the Los Angeles County Bar Associa-
tion:
The release also contains comments setting forth the SEC's view as to the
need for the free flow of information in the international capital markets.
The specific proposals are stated to reflect the Commission's opinion that
new foreign issuer registration and reporting forms are necessary to fur-
ther the goals of the federal securities laws, and that dual systems of re-
porting for foreign issuers and domestic issuers are contrary to the best
interests of the investors.16
No one can doubt the bona fide need, but many may have concern over
the consequences.
In the field of international boycotts the United States has again
found it necessary to seek extraterritorial application of domestic laws.
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has not believed in the
use of boycotts as an instrument of foreign policy. American trade em-
bargoes, imposed under the Trading with the Enemy Act 17 against
Communist China, Cuba, Vietnam and other countries, have over the
years caused difficulties to British ships, which for various lawful and
proper reasons have entered the harbors of these boycotted countries.
The same problems have faced several other countries friendly to
the United States. In December, 1964, for example, it was unlawful in
the United States to trade with the People's Republic of China. France,
on the other hand, who did not have such an embargo, was anxious to
increase its exports, and in particular wanted to increase its trade with
the Chinese mainland. When a French exporter approached Fruehauf-
France, which was a French corporation, and offered to purchase sixty
of its trailers for delivery to the People's Republic of China, the ex-
porter was providing an attractive offer to the French company. How-
ever, the French company was two-thirds owned by Fruehauf-
International, which was a United States company. Hence, when the
United States government began to investigate the transaction, Frue-
hauf-International instructed Fruehauf-France to cancel the contract.
The minority shareholders of Fruehauf-France went to a French court
15 Exchange Act Release No. 14,128 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
81,361 (Nov. 2, 1977).
16 Address by Richard K. Roeder, Los Angeles County Bar Association Luncheon Address
(May 26, 1978).
17 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 etseq. (1970) (originally enacted as Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,
ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411).
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and, using a concept in French law called abus de drolt (an abuse of a
legal right), had the court appoint an officer to run the company and
complete the sale.18 The grounds for this decision of the French Court
were strong. The trailers were being manufactured in France, finance
was being provided by French creditors, and if Fruehauf-France had
not supplied the trailers, they would have lost the contract to other
French competitors. Moreover, the French court was concerned that
the recission of the contract by Fruehauf-France could have resulted in
reparation damages being granted to the French exporter in excess of
five million francs. This in turn could have driven Fruehauf-France
into bankruptcy and deprived its employees of their jobs. Whatever
may have been the merits of the U.S. foreign policy towards Commu-
nist China and whatever may have been the merits of this policy in the
interests of the free world, the attempted extraterritorial application of
U.S. laws would have had, if not resisted, serious consequences upon
persons and a corporation operating inside the jurisdiction of another
nation. 19
While U.S. allies took pleasure in the stand taken against boycotts
in the most recent Export Administration Amendments, 20 we unfortu-
nately encountered the same jurisdictional problem. These amend-
ments prohibit any participation with, or support of, those who are
imposing boycotts against countries friendly to the United States and
provide the power for seeking information on these boycott activities.
2 '
Thus Congress seeks jurisdiction, worldwide, against any "United
States person.' ' 22 These include not only present residents in the
United States but also "any domestic concern (including any perma-
nent domestic establishment of a foreign concern) and any foreign sub-
18 Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy, [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, [1965] J.C.P. II 14,274bis (Cour d'appel,
Paris). This case is discussed more thoroughly in Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy
Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 579 (1970).
19 See generaly Craig, supra note 18; Fortenberry, Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Antitrust
Violations-Paths through the Great Grimpen Mfire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519 (1971); Nothstein, Mul-
tinational Corporation and the Extraterritorial Application ofthe Labor Management Relations Act,
10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1976); Comment, An Interest Analysis Approach to ExtraterritorialAppli-
cation fRule 10b-5, 52 TEx. L. REV. 984 (1974); Comment, Offshore Mutual Funds. Extraterrito-
rial Application ofthe Securities Act of1934, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1225 (1972); Note,
American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976); Note, The
Conflict ofLaws and the Extraterritorial Application ofthe Sherman Act, 4 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 164 (1972); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication ofSection 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 34 OHIO ST. L.J.
342 (1973); and Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws
Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1005 (1976).
20 Pub. L. No. 95-52, tit. II, 91 Stat. 235 (1977) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 2401 et seq. (1970)).
21 Id sec. 201, § 4A(b).
22 Id sec. 204, § 11(2).
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sidiary or affiliate (including any permanent foreign establishment) of
any domestic conern which is controlled in fact by such domestic con-
cern. . .."23
While we all may wish to outlaw boycotts, there will sometimes be
good reasons for U.S. allies to impose, or cooperate with, boycotts of
which American foreign policy makers disapprove. More than that, in
the fertile and troubled Middle East, which was the very area in the
world in which Congress in passing the Export Administration Amend-
ments directed its attention,24 enormously difficult decisions face trad-
ers who find themselves caught between rival factions. With the Arab
countries on one side saying to a trader "if you do business with Israel
then you will face penalties," and with the United States saying to that
same trader "if you cooperate with their demands you will face penal-
ties," that unfortunate trader is in a fair quandary. Viewing the laby-
rinth of national and international corporate structure I venture to
suggest that the assumption of jurisdiction over "any foreign. . . affili-
ate. . . of any domestic concern which is controlled in fact by such
domestic concern"2 5 could have very wide implications. In a sense
these provisions are "anti-boycott" boycotts carrying with them many
of the problems of the former beasts.
Again, it is not over the substance of these laws that we complain,
but over the means by which Congress and the courts seeks enforce-
ment extraterritorially. Of all activities, therefore, the most conspicu-
ous and the greatest source of trouble has been with the attempts to
apply U.S. discovery procedures abroad. This was at the heart of the
problem in the WestinghouseM6 proceedings in England. I know of no
country with more extensive advocacy proceedings. In the United
Kingdom, only very limited powers can be exercised against persons
who are not parties to actions. Further, there are no means by which
such parties can be compelled to give upon oath pre-trial evidence or to
hand over all the files in their office for inspection by parties to an
action. The problems resulting from the discovery procedures of the
United States were considered at the Hague Convention on Taking Ev-
idence Abroad.27 In the end it was agreed that a contracting state to
23 Id
24 See H.R. REP. No. 95-190, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 4-6, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 362, 365-67.
25 Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, tit. II, sec. 204, § 11(2), 91
Stat. 235.
26 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L.). See
note 3 supra.
27 Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
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this convention may declare, "that it will not execute Letters of Request
for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known
in Common Law countries.
'28
Associated with discovery procedures, another weapon which has
caused difficulty abroad is the use of Civil Investigative Demands
(CID's) by the Justice Department. 29 When, for example, the Justice
Department used CID's for investigating the activities of North Atlan-
tic shipping companies in 1976, our Under-Secretary of State for
Trade, Mr. Stanley Clinton-Davis, stated in our Parliament that the
disclosure of the documents then being sought from British companies
would constitute an infringement of the jurisdiction which, under inter-
national law, belongs to the United Kingdom. It has, therefore, been
the inevitable response of other nations, who should be assisting you
and not hindering you, to put up barriers. Indeed, a number of coun-
tries and states, in direct response to U.S. discovery procedures, have
enacted laws with criminal penalties to prohibit the extraterritorial re-
moval or other disclosure of commercial documents.
30
As this ardent fight over the rights to see and obtain documents
has raged between America and her allies, the last laugh has by no
means been with us. In In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation3 l for exam-
signature, Mar. 18, 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, [19721 U.S.T. 2555. The convention was adopted at
the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law on Oct. 26, 1968. The
United States signed the convention on July 27, 1970, and ratified it on July 15, 1972.
28 Id art. 23.
29 Civil Investigative Demands are issued pursuant to section 3 of the Antitrust Civil Process
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976). Section 3(a) provides:
Whenever the Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Divison of the Department of Justice, has reason to believe that any person may be
in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material, or may have any information,
relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, he may, prior to the institution of a civil or criminal
proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investi-
gative demand requiring such person to produce such documentary material for inspection
and copying or reproduction, to answer in writing written interrogatories, to give oral testi-
mony concerning documentary material or information, or to furnish any combination of
such material, answers, or testimony.
Id § 1312(a). Section 3(d) of the act purports to extend service to non-nationals "[t]o the extent
that the courts of the United States can assert jurisdiction over such persons consistent with due
process." Id § 1312(d).
30 See Business Concerns Records Act, QuE. REV. STAT. ch. 278, § 2 (1964); Loi frddrale
modifiant la loi sur les banques et les caisses d'6pargne, art. 47, [1971] I Feuille Frdrrale 557, 568
(Switz.); Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87, § 2; Uranium Informa-
tion Security Regulations, § 2, 110 Can. Gaz. 2747 (1976) (issued pursuant to section 9 of the
Atomic Energy Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-19, § 9 (1970)); and Wet Economische
Mededinging, § 42 [1956] Staatsblad vor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] No. 401, as
amended by [1971] Stb. No. 774, [1971] Stb. No. 96, and [1958] Stb. No. 413, translated in 5
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (NETHERLANDS) § 1.0, at 1 (1960).
31 M.D.L. No. 50 (D.D.C. November 22, 1978) (final decree approving settlement and award
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ple, Beecham Group Limited, one of the leading British pharmaceuti-
cal companies, argued that compliance with a U.S. discovery order
would have meant producing documents which Beecham was prohib-
ited from producing under United Kingdom law. The district court,
however, found that Beecham had made no effort to seek reconsidera-
tion of the United Kingdom-imposed prohibition and had failed to ne-
gotiate with the British government to achieve compliance with the
U.S. court order.32 It then proceeded to enter an order resolving all
facts against Beecham on all issues upon which Beecham had, by not
producing the documents, failed to comply. The United Kingdom De-
partment of Trade, possibly now being rather harder pressed by
Beecham, relented and permitted the production of all the documents,
except for thirty-six which were treated as confidential.
What conclusions can be drawn? First and foremost, one can con-
clude that it is in the interests of the whole world that there should be
international "fair play" in the conduct of our commercial affairs. In-
deed, in the conduct of all activity which bears upon the interests of
sovereign nations, it is in the interests of the world that there should be
a binding international code in the conduct of trade which enforces the
concept of fair competition. This is, of course, what antitrust is all
about.
Secondly, it should be recognized that every country has the right
to protect its own interests and the right to ask other countries to assist
in the protection of those legitimate interests. It has long been recog-
nized by many countries that criminals (who do not succeed in placing
themselves into the category of political refugees) should be extradited
from one country to another when they have committed crimes within
the requesting country. Given international recognition of this princi-
ple, a country should be entitled to protect its own interests and to seek
cooperation from other countries for that purpose.
The United States has more cause than any other country in the
free world to ask for cooperation from friends and allies. The extent to
which the rest of the world relies upon the United States for its political
of attorneys' fees). Extensive pre-trial maneuvering preceded the final decree. The published
history of the Ampicillin litigation includes: [1978] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,105 (D.D.C.
May 8, 1978); [1978] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,043 (D.D.C.); [1977] 1 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 61,434 (D.D.C.); 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C. 1972); [1971] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 73,449
(D.D.C.); [1971] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 73,475 (D.D.C.); and 315 F. Supp. 317 (Jud. Panel
Mult. Lit. 1970).
32 In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 50 (D.D.C. 1973). This finding of the
district court is unreported. A background summary of some of the objections raised by
Beechams to plaintiffs' requests for discovery is provided in [1978] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1 62,043 (D.D.C.).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:1(1979)
and economic well-being is enormous. In 1977, U.S. investments
abroad reached $149 billion.33 The number of people in the world who
are directly or indirectly supported by the United States economy is
also of high proportions.34 In short, the United States does not lack
justification in seeking extraterritorial application of its laws. When
modified as necessary and implemented with the consent of other na-
tions, these laws could and should be welcomed by the international
community. Regrettably, Congress and agencies of the United States
government have chosen to take unilateral rather than universal action.
But as I have tried to illustrate, unilateral action is wrong for the
United Kingdom, wrong for the United States, and wrong for the world
at large. It offends America's allies and usually deprives her of her
objectives.
I view international conventions, while useful for public debate, as
a clumsy means of enabling nations of the world to join together for
coercive and effective action. The answer will lie in separate treaties
between nations. I suggest, therefore, that if our governments are not
yet engaged in negotiating a treaty on the law of international competi-
tion, we should urge them to do so.
33 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 94 (1979).
34 It is possible to roughly estimate the number of people supported world-wide by U.S. indus-
try. In 1973, Anthony Sampson reported the number of people employed by ITT throughout the
world at 400,000. A. SAMPSON, THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF ITT 18 (1973). Well over half of the
first 200 corporations listed in The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest U.S. Industrial
Corporations, FORTUNE, May 1978, at 238, have substantial operations overseas. It would proba-
bly not be unreasonable to multiply the ITT figure by fifty to bring the world-wide total of people
employed by American owned companies to 20,000,000. If every employee supports four others,
industry abroad supports approximately 80,000,000 people.
